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Institutional Choice and Bureaucratic
Autonomy in Germany
MARIAN DÖHLER
A growing body of literature refers to a transformation of state structures in
OECD nations that consists of an expansion of non-majoritarian
institutions, particularly independent administrative agencies. Among
others, this thesis is advocated by Majone, who argues that the transition
from the positive to the regulatory state generates a functional need to adopt
a US-like agency model.1 Evidence can be detected at the EU level, but also
at the national level. The argument is backed by current research about
sectoral regulation whereby regulatory agencies are used as safeguards or
initiators of competition in formerly state-supplied areas such as water,
energy or telecommunication.2 No less supportive for the ‘agencification’
thesis is the ‘New Public Management’ discourse in which the separation
between policies and operations is strongly recommended as a tool to
enhance government efficiency.3
A closer look at this phenomenon reveals three dimensions. First,
agencies, defined as administrative units separated from federal or central
government departments, appear to gain more political relevance, due
mainly to their regulatory functions. Second, there is an increase in numbers
of newly created agencies, measurable in a number of OECD nations, and
most vigorously so in the UK where the policy/operations split is almost
completely implemented by hiving off so-called executive agencies from
ministerial departments.4 Finally, either as a result of organisational
decentralisation or their managerial functions, agencies are expected to
become more independent from top-down political interference, thereby
changing the command–control model of bureaucracy. Taken together,
these dimensions lend political importance to the process of agencification. 
The analytical framework to deal with this phenomenon has mainly been
institutional convergence. But if agencification is explored within the
German context, some striking differences occur. Within the system of
government institutions agencies only play a subordinate role. In the official
language they are usually referred to as ‘non-ministerial federal
administration’.5 Furthermore, the idea of constructing administrative
agencies as non-majoritarian institutions, protected from political
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interference into single decisions, has not gained ground. Rather,
bureaucratic autonomy is still seen as contrary to the principle of democratic
legitimacy that requires elected politicians to retain control. A final
peculiarity is the resistance to using regulatory agencies as a standard
response to the re-regulation of deregulated industries. Mostly policy
makers try to find a solution within the existing framework, often via
associational self-regulation. These observations are admittedly based on
general indicators and the presumed deviation from the OECD mainstream
may appear less pronounced if, for example, the cross-national equivalence
of the dependent variable (that is, independent agencies) is defined
differently. What sets the German case apart, however, is the combination
of three factors that reduce the political role of administrative agencies. The
first task of this discussion, then, is to explain their peculiar position in the
German politico-administrative system and their lack of political
independence.
A second more theoretical aim is derived from the principal–agent
(P–A) perspective that dominates research about delegation. Even if the
P–A approach could be used as a framework, open to different hypotheses,
most applications exhibit a strong magnetism for rationalist behavioural
assumptions. P–A analyses are usually built around the problem of political
control and typically include the following assumptions.6 Administrative
agencies mainly emerge out of a ‘clash of interests’ – all actors in this game,
that is, legislators, presidents, interest groups and bureaucrats, pursue their
own, often contradictory preferences, thus justifying the assumption that the
form of delegated functions is based on highly rational and instrumental
considerations; because these contradictions are built into the structure of an
agency, a constant ‘fear of shirking’ leads politicians to produce regulations,
rules, reporting requirements, and other measures for bureaucratic control;
and this in turn causes an enduring ‘conflict over control’ fuelled by the
willingness of all actors to gain a competitive advantage whenever possible.
These assumptions are not necessarily wrong or irrelevant, but they
privilege an analytical perspective that is biased to exclude motives other
than rational-instrumental. By taking up this problem, the second aim is to
provide evidence for the argument that the instrumental rationality of
institutional design and control decisions should not be overestimated. 
This theoretical predisposition may appear somewhat outdated since
modifications of some hard-core P–A assumptions have appeared over the
past decade,7 mainly through the integration of institutional factors,
accepting non-utilitarian motives, and empirical arguments about a political
process lacking a functional order, beset with goal ambiguities and post-hoc
rationalisations. Despite such analytical extensions, P–A analysts still have
problems escaping from the rational choice world of ‘sophisticated
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economics and simple politics’.8 Two of the persistent objections against the
functionalism implicit in rationalist theories, recently summarised by
Pierson,9 also apply to mainstream P–A theories. First, actors are not
necessarily instrumental in all their decisions, not only because they adhere
to the logic of appropriateness, but also because the question of proper
design is not raised. Second, policy makers often do not anticipate long or
even medium term consequences of their choices. This is quite reasonable
when considering the difficulties of assessing causal relations between
policy goals and particular institutional arrangements.10
The explanatory concept applied here, therefore, emphasises the
bounded rationality model and its derivates.11 More specifically, it is
assumed that institutional choices are often based on no or low preference
decisions. Hence, even the term ‘choice’ may be misleading because of its
preference-based image. This is not to say that interests or goal-oriented
preferences are suspended or irrelevant; they do play a role in almost every
political decision. However, this does not necessarily imply that policy
makers are concerned with the problem of administrative design. The
complexity of the political problems needing to be addressed is only one
reason to concentrate on substantial aspects instead. Other reasons are the
availability of reliable and undisputed administrative models or a lack of
party competition, both of which would prevent actors from exploiting
organisational questions. 
Whether policy makers will act this way depends from the institutional
setting within which they act, and this inevitably raises the question of how
the institutional forces work. Among those scholars who have tried to
elaborate the ‘institutions matter’ argument, Moe and Caldwell deserve
special attention as their analysis is a rare example to link different modes
of executive control with the structure of government in a systematic way.
The initial assumption is that the institutional form of government, such as
the separation of powers in the US or the parliamentary system in the UK,
‘programs a whole array of system features’12 by generating distinct sets of
incentives. The position and performance of agencies is affected by the
degree to which control is unified, the varying responsiveness of legislators
to interest groups, the accruing need to formalise durable deals, and the
degree of agency politicisation. Together this forms a ‘genetic code’ for
bureaucratic structures and the way they are controlled.13 The following
analysis will consider these analytical perspectives.
OBSERVATIONS ON AN ‘AGENCY LAGGARD’
German observers like to stress the multiplicity of the units of the federal
administration as reflected in variations in their size, function, legal status,
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and political or economic relevance. Currently, there are no less than 639
different non-ministerial public authorities (Behörden) at the federal level,
ranging from rather obscure, hardly noticed units to huge and well-known
agencies such as the Federal Environment Office or the Federal Cartel
Office (FCO).14 According to a fine-grained legal framework, four basic
types of federal authorities can be distinguished: Federal agencies
(Bundesoberbehörden), self-governing bodies (öffentlich-rechtliche
Körperschaften and Anstalten), public enterprises (Bundesunternehmen),
and charged administrations (Bundesverrichtungsverwaltung). The first two
types belong to the sphere of public law. The other two are private law
organisations. Among these types, there is a clear hierarchy, allowing core
government functions (hoheitliche Aufgaben) only to be delegated to
federal agencies.15 This type of agency enforces major administrative
functions at the federal level such as banking, insurance or drug control, and
cartel law. Although the legal rules are rather vague, a recurrent pattern has
emerged to delegate functions with decreasing political relevance to the
other types, that is, touchy political functions are likely to go hand in hand
with closer ministerial control. Typically social security funds, public banks
or government research institutes are organised as self-governing bodies,
whereas public enterprises and charged administrations mainly have
entrepreneurial functions that are thought to perform better outside the
restrictions of the public sector. If the following analysis is confined to the
roughly 40 federal agencies, the reason is that only this type of authority
performs functions, including regulation, that have the chance to enter the
sphere of politics, thereby rendering the question of design and control more
interesting.
What all federal authorities have in common is their subordination, in
varying degrees, to some sort of ministerial oversight. Due to their private
law status, public enterprises and administrations charged with missions are
only subject to a control at arm’s length, mainly by ministerial bureaucrats
acting as shareholders. In the case of self-governing bodies, oversight is
restricted to legal aspects (Rechtsaufsicht). Federal agencies are additionally
exposed to technical oversight (Fachaufsicht),16 a remarkably indeterminate
piece of public law that allows ministerial departments to issue instructions
on virtually every substantial aspect of agency activities, including the
reversal of single decisions. 
There are a few exceptions to this rule, most notably the FCO and the
Regulatory Agency for Telecommunication and Postal Services (RegTP),
both of which are partly excluded from ministerial instructions. Cases like
these have been dealt with in legal thinking as ministerialfreie Räume (areas
free from ministerial oversight).17 This legal doctrine, based on the idea of a
continuous chain of democratic legitimacy and control, provides that an
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exemption from ministerial oversight should be limited to very special and
well-founded cases. Although it is stressed that parliament is equally
empowered to grant a fairly wide range of discretion to agencies, this is
couched in a rule-exception scheme that clearly limits the appearance of
autonomous authorities. This is well supported by general construction
principles of public administration in Germany. 
At the federal level, the so-called Ressortprinzip (departmental
principle) is essential for executive organisation. Article 65 of the
constitution stipulates that, within the policy guidelines set by the
chancellor and cabinet decisions, ‘each federal minister shall conduct the
affairs of his department independently and in his own responsibility’. In
practice, this rule creates a domain for each department that is often eagerly
defended and not only applies to substantial policies but, almost to a greater
extent, to the internal affairs of federal agencies. Ministers appoint agency
heads, decide about their budgets and command a far-reaching power
(Organisationsgewalt) to reorganise, downsize, merge, or abolish agencies
within their competence (Zuständigkeit).18 If this requires re-writing the
enabling law, the majority factions in parliament usually follow suit.
Without any explicit reference, the departmental principle has given birth to
the equally heavyweight normative principle of ministerial responsibility.
As in most parliamentary democracies, this doctrine requires individual
ministers to appear before parliament and, if asked, to report, answer
questions, and to take the blame for omissions or failures within their
competence.19 But, on top of this common obligation, ministerial
responsibility has had quite unique repercussions on the role assigned to
federal agencies. Even if important political functions are delegated to them,
which is not unusual, they retain a subordinate status and are not given the
chance to become ‘non-majoritarian’ in terms of escaping ministerial
control. 
The federalist structure of the German polity is another important factor
for defining the role of agencies. In fact, a substantial number of federal
laws are not implemented by the federal government but instead are enacted
by the Länder. If devolving public functions to decentralised administrative
units is an aim of creating agencies, then the federal allocation of functions
has certainly reduced these kind of pressures. However, allocating functions
across different levels of government (central/local) should not be confused
with the devolution of functions at one level, as is the case if the Länder
administration is regarded as the functional equivalent to British executive
agencies.20 In principle there are enough policies to be delegated to agencies
at the federal level. What seems more important about the argument of
federalism is the legislative veto right that the Länder can use to block the
expansion of federal administrative bodies with regional or local field
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offices. However, this veto can be, and is, bypassed if a new agency is
organised solely at the federal level. This has severely reduced the ability of
the Länder to restrict the creation of new federal agencies, especially during
the post-war reconstruction era. The Länder continue to be concerned about
the growth of federal competencies and functions, and in energy or rail
regulation they oppose new regulatory agencies at the federal level. But if
federal policy makers agree to create, for example, a new agency for
consumer protection, it is difficult for the Länder to avoid such a decision.
Thus, on the one hand, federalism has reduced the need to think about
decentralising federal functions but, on the other hand, is not a severe
restriction for creating new agencies at the federal level either.
Aside from federalism, the frequent integration of interest groups into
policy making is regarded as the trademark of German politics. Often this
takes the shape of associational self-regulation replacing government
interventions and therefore rendering new regulatory agencies superfluous.
This argument is supported by examples such as health care, energy, or
consumer protection. But two caveats need to be considered as well. The
first is that self-regulation is embedded in a highly legalised political
setting21 that throughout makes self-regulation and government regulation
more complementary than mutually exclusive. Typically, agreements are
checked for their conformity with government policy goals and their
enforcement is supervised by public authorities or even translated into
binding law. Agencies, for example in banking or insurance regulation,
strongly rely on associational agreements instead of replacing them.
Second, functional equivalence may also work in the reverse, as is the case
with associational agreements in energy policy whose function is to set rules
for a more competitive electricity and gas market. Not only the contents, but
also the implementation of these agreements are supervised by the federal
Department of Economics and the introduction of a regulatory agency in the
energy sector has been used as a threat to force associations to conform with
federal government’s policy goals.22 Since the introduction of the RegTP,
such a threat is no longer improbable and receives more support as
deregulation shows perceptible price reductions. 
This short overview leads to two conclusions. First, the legal-
constitutional framework does not prescribe a single best way for
administrative organisation. There are neither strong restrictions on the
range of delegation nor constitutional doctrines that strictly prohibit
autonomous agencies. There is considerable leeway for using agencies,
including independent ones, as a tool for government policies. Second,
although federalism and associational self-regulation reduce the functional
need for regulatory institutions, they do not represent serious restrictions
either.
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EX-ANTE DESIGN BETWEEN INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE AND
INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS
In rationalist accounts institutions result from deliberate choices made to
achieve substantial policy goals, to reduce transaction costs, or to overcome
collective decision making problems. It is therefore hard to imagine that
setting up a new agency is not accompanied by all those ‘deck-stacking’
elements23 usually considered as the bread and butter of politics in P–A
analyses. However, an alternative way to conceptualise the process of
agency creation is to assume that institutional dynamics, or ‘creeping
institutional change’,24 prevail over conscious and goal-oriented
institutional choices. Following this idea, result-based institutional reform
could be expected to decrease if existing government institutions have the
capacity to relieve policy makers from engaging in time-consuming and
costly considerations about alternative structures, control problems and the
consequences of agency design. Presumably, this will be the case if policy
makers have no incentives to put these problems at the very centre of the
legislative struggle, mainly because institutional or other factors provide
reliable standard solutions to agency design and control. The argument,
illustrated in the following cases, is that the German political system
contains several attributes that allow institutional dynamics to prevail over
institutional choice. 
The 1950s were not only the decade of economic reconstruction, but
also the heyday of agency creation. No less than 19 Bundesoberbehörden
were set up during this period. Among them was the FCO, founded in 1957
after a long and bitterly fought legislative battle known as the ‘seven years
war’.25 After initial hostility from German industry calmed down, the FCO
became almost celebrated, not only due to its tough anti-trust enforcement,
but also for its independent status. How can this be reconciled with the
picture presented above? Part of the explanation is to be found in the vague
rules establishing the agency’s independence.26 The law only mentions that
general instructions must be published in the federal register (§ 49 GWB).
One controversial interpretation, among others supported by FCO officials,
is that this prohibits special instructions (Einzelweisungen). But this could
be, and is, also understood the other way around, that is, there is no
obligation to publish special instructions. In the overseeing Department of
Economics the view is still held that the FCO’s independence is only a
customary right (Gewohnheitsrecht) without any formal guarantee.27
But even these concessions seem misplaced in the midst of an otherwise
hierarchy-dominated administrative organisation. Due to pressures on
German government by the American occupational forces to implement
anti-trust legislation, the FCO’s status was often regarded as conforming to
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the US tradition of independent agencies. However, a closer look reveals
that American influence evaporated over the years. The exemption of the
divisions from ministerial instructions was justified in parliament with
reference to the Federal Patent Office and the Federal Insurance Oversight
Agency,28 both of which already embodied ‘court-like’29 decision making
bodies. But these historical legacies are only part of the explanation. By
looking at the broader context it seems more likely that the FCO as well as
the Bundesbank, equipped with an even more pronounced degree of
independence, emerged in a situation in which granting autonomy to federal
agencies was still an open question. At this point, the constitutional doctrine
of ministerial responsibility had not yet solidified in practice, nor had other
delegation-hostile concepts become politically effective. With the gradual
emergence of this doctrine and its derivates, both Bundesbank and
Bundeskartellamt were perceived as exceptions.30 This not only prevented a
tradition of mimetic isomorphism among other federal agencies, the notion
of singularity even made it redundant to justify why independence was not
granted to other agencies. As German policy makers experienced their
hands being tied whenever they were exposed to uncomfortable decisions
by non-majoritarian institutions, including the Constitutional Court, a silent
consensus emerged not to proliferate this type of Nebenregierung
(supplementary government).31 The irony of both the FCO and, to a greater
degree, the Bundesbank is that they became widely recognised for being
independent from political intrusions but at the same time contributed to an
institutional dynamic in which subordinating agencies to ministerial
oversight was perceived as a democracy enhancing constitutional standard. 
This process did not surface as a series of conscious decisions. The
‘rule’ to subordinate federal agencies has remained more an implicit
preference than a clear-cut regulation. Students of public administration
have consistently observed low interest by politicians for administrative
design and reform.32 As is often the case if political preferences are diffuse
or non-existent,33 the ministerial bureaucracy becomes the main actor, and
this frequently happens within the domain of the Rechtsformenwahl (choice
of legal status). However, there is no indication that ministerial choices have
gone beyond the application of routine legal models. In those few cases in
which this process is mentioned at all, the focus is on privatisation, that is,
the transition from public to private legal status.34 Questions related to
agency design or controls are largely neglected. Certainly, the enactment of
enabling laws is by no means free from political disputes. But the focus is
clearly on the range of functions delegated to an agency rather than on the
range of discretion or administrative autonomy. 
A more recent case to exhibit exactly this pattern is financial market
regulation.35 Since the 1980s, German banks, insurance companies, and
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large industrial firms felt the increasing need to move the cartelised and
self-regulation based German model of capital market regulation closer
towards US-like standards. Driven by anxieties over loss of attractiveness
for foreign investors, especially in the stock and securities market, the
financial community successfully lobbied for the introduction of the
Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapierhandel (BAW) in 1994. Despite the
US Securities and Exchange Commission, an independent commission by
definition, figuring prominently in the debate preceding the enabling law, no
thoughts were given to the question of political control. The BAW was
almost automatically constructed as a federal agency subject to ministerial
oversight. If there is a credible commitment to protecting a particular policy
it is situated on the abstract level of having sectoral government regulation,
leaving open the backdoor for the federal government to intervene in agency
policies. The efficiency of the BAW to regulate stock exchange
transactions, such as preventing insider trading, certainly depends more on
the law enforcement capacity than on the degree of independence. But the
straightforward attitude to adopt a particular legal form reflects a persistent
pattern of relying on a tried and tested agency model. This underlines that
the German way is not to have no delegation at all, but to restrict
bureaucratic autonomy almost automatically by subordinating agencies to
ministerial oversight. 
Drug regulation is one of the few occasions on which controls on agency
decisions have been thoroughly discussed during the legislative process.36
The law, enacted in 1976, contained an unusually large number of measures
to empower countervailing interests. A system of commissions, staffed with
external experts including representatives from the pharmaceutical industry,
plays an important role in the drug admission procedure. A reporting
requirement to parliament was included for the first time, and post-market
drug surveillance was arranged as a co-operative, somewhat ponderous
procedure, again embracing a broad range of external experts. Certainly,
this piece of legislation is no example for an ‘auto-pilot’ pattern of agency
design. It shows that German policy makers may well consider frontloaded
measures to temper agency activism, thus conforming to rational-
instrumentalism. On the other hand, drug regulation also reflects interest
accommodation through expert committees or co-operative arrangements as
a typical pattern of the German administrative rule system.37
The most puzzling case in recent years was the introduction of the
RegTP. Starting its operation in 1998, the agency was immediately received
as a major innovation in at least three aspects. First, the agency adopted a
highly visible, almost political role that triggered an unusual amount of
attention and conflict. Second, it is regarded as the only ‘real’ regulatory
agency, representing the arrival of the regulatory state in Germany.38 Third,
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it is the first federal agency ever since the FCO back in 1957 to receive a
limited exemption from ministerial oversight. These peculiarities reflect the
whole field of telecom regulation being embedded in a deregulation–
globalisation discourse and such large-scale political processes certainly
have the power to overthrow national standard operating procedures. The
creation of the RegTP has not swept away the model of a hierarchical
administrative structure, but has demonstrated that pressures, primarily
from the EU, to conform to a new regulatory regime exist and should be
taken into account when considering the future of the German model. 
During the legislative deliberation preceding the 1996 tele-
communication act, the problem of agency monitoring and independence
was discussed at some length.39 The unusual willingness of policy makers to
address this subject and to enact a limited exemption from ministerial
instructions shows a clear deviation from institutional dynamics. This is
underlined by the original plan to set up the RegTP as the highest federal
authority (oberste Bundesbehörde), enjoying an independent status equal to
the Bundesbank. But lawyers soon reminded policy makers about the logic
of appropriateness,40 thus redirecting attention towards imitating the FCO
model rather than inventing a completely new kind of agency.41 This
indicates that the autopilot of German institutional dynamics was not
completely disengaged. 
The internal structure of the RegTP owes much to the FCO. Six collegial
decision chambers were set up for some important agency functions such as
licensing and price regulation. Analogous to the FCO divisions, these
chambers are widely regarded as being free from ministerial instructions.
But this is only inferred from their court-like image and nowhere guaranteed
in the law. The Telecommunications Act (TKG) only stipulates that general
instructions by the responsible Department of Economics have to be
published in the federal register (§ 66 TKG). This has prompted a
sophisticated and controversial legal debate, the result of which is that
ministerial instructions should be issued very carefully. Thus, the RegTP’s
much proclaimed independence is shrouded in vagueness, as in the case of
the FCO. It remains vulnerable to instructions as long the federal
government remains a major shareholder of Deutsche Telekom AG, and the
labour market problems of this and other former monopolists, caused by
privatisation, are relevant for policy makers. In practice, the overseeing
department has issued several general and special instructions.42 Again, if
agency design was meant to offer credible commitment, it went only  half-
way.
The conclusion to be derived from this section is not that conscious
choices about agency design are non-existent, but that they are embedded in
an institutional dynamic allowing policy makers a low preference stance
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with respect to monitoring and control measures. The underlying rationale
could be described as ‘design without grand decisions’.43 As single policy-
related cases will always show more or less pronounced deviations from this
standard model, their importance should not be overestimated, as is the case
with the RegTP. If we take a P–A point of view, yet another question occurs.
German policy makers apparently reduce the transaction costs of agency
creation by treating the problem of monitoring and control as already solved
through ministerial oversight. The question, then, is whether there are any
incentives to work on changing this? Answering this question requires an
analysis of the incentives generated by the broader institutional setting of
government. 
THE INSTITUTIONAL ORDER OF GOVERNMENT
Following Moe and Caldwell, the identification of institutional genetics
should start with the relationship between executive and legislative powers.
In this respect, the two models of presidential and cabinet/parliamentary
government represent the most basic institutional configurations.44 In a
presidential system of government, such as the US, the separation of power
charges two equally legitimised institutions with controlling the executive.
This ‘parallel’ system not only hampers a unified control but also triggers
continuing conflicts between both constitutional powers.45 Furthermore,
legislators in Congress have strong incentives to react to group pressures as
they depend on their support for re-election. As a result, agencies are
exposed to a broad and sophisticated repertoire of political measures, all
directed at maximising the gains or minimising the losses of politicians and
clienteles. Making an agency independent is equally used either as a shield
against competing congressional and presidential influence or to expose
agencies to countervailing interests. To sum up, the American political
system places federal agencies and commissions under a multiple-principal
regime that generates strong incentives to make use of an extensive
repertoire of supervisory measures.
No such running strategic battles exist in the German parliamentary
system. As opposed to the US case, German government is based on a
‘sequential’ order of institutions, that is, parliament, cabinet, and the
executive are arranged consecutively, thus allowing a unified and usually
hierarchical administrative control. With the federal government being
elected and supported by the majority parties in parliament, the likelihood
of conflicting interests between majority factions and cabinet is extremely
low. Furthermore, the responsiveness of legislators to demands of interest
groups is boiled down through strong discipline of parliamentary factions.
Since political parties command the decisive resources for re-election of
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individual MPs, they are less inclined to follow group pressures and more
to subordinate to a fairly coherent party line. Administrative agencies are
thereby situated in a clearly defined environment. Overseeing competencies
rests with the responsible minister, thus reducing the incentives for
legislators to be interested in such an ‘executive-centred’ administration. In
contrast to the US system where executive and ‘legislative-centred’46
agencies exist at the same time, their German counterparts are only
confronted with a single principal. Consequently, neither parliamentary
sponsorship of agencies nor micromanagement aspirations have appeared.
Certainly, parliamentary controls of executive action are regarded as an
important constitutional function, just as in most other democracies. But by
all measures, legislative controls over the executive in Germany are not
designed to exercise a perceptible influence over the federal bureaucracy.47
This brings ministerial responsibility back in. Implicit to the concept is
a transfer of agency monitoring from parliament to individual cabinet
ministers. Parliamentary controls are seen as sufficient even if they remain
‘sporadic’ and ‘coincidental’.48 Their function is more to offer a threat than
actual enforcement. Part of the German version of ministerial responsibility
is its direct linkage to administrative organisation. Underlying is the idea
that individual political responsibility can be invoked only as long and as far
as ministers possess influence over their portfolios. The best guarantee to
achieve this goal is the unlimited ministerial right to issue instructions. This,
in turn, requires a hierarchical model of organisation and processes.49 It is
this very connection with democratic legitimacy that makes hierarchy an
almost indispensable element of administrative structure. During day-to-
day work it is not expressed in a rigid command-and-control fashion. The
hierarchy principle, routinely referred to in law and administrative science
textbooks, is even increasingly hidden under the language of a
modernisation discourse that stresses co-operation and decentralised
responsibility. But in case of conflicts or diverging opinions, hierarchy
serves as a ‘rule of last resort’,50 covering other forms of interaction. It is
definitely among the elements constituting the genetic code of the German
administrative landscape.
Ministerial responsibility, however, is not a sufficient explanation for
low political conflict on agency operations. Since parliament is divided
between majority and opposition parties, the latter might be expected to
exercise a more vigorous control. Of course, the typical game is that
majority parties practice solidarity with cabinet, whereas opposition parties
critically assess government policies whenever possible. However, the
focus of partisan disputes is more on individual ministers’ ability to head a
department and does not concern agency policies. It makes more sense for
opposing parties to aim at cabinet and not to waste energy on agencies
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which, at any rate, are appropriately thought of as a ministerial appendage
rather than as political actors in their own right.51 This also makes interest
group pressures for changes in agency policies more effective if they are
directed at the incumbent minister who is equipped with oversight authority,
and not at the parliamentary opposition that can, at best, try to mobilise the
public. The most frequent technique used by groups or industries to
influence an agency’s operation is through administrative courts.52 By doing
so these actors contribute to the transformation of unsolved political
conflicts into legal problems. Of course, judicial activism may backfire and
force legislators to react. But, as is illustrated by the long-lasting atomic
energy conflict, the legalisation strategy also keeps conflicts pending
without forcing painful political decisions.53
Aside from incentives generated by the institutional order of
government, an important reason for policy makers not to be concerned
with agency design and control is the performance of bureaucracy. If it is
based on ‘neutral competence’,54 that is, agencies could be expected to serve
the party in power as well as to enforce law in a neutral, public interest-
oriented way, the likelihood increases that opposing parties agree to keep
agencies out of politics because they want to benefit equally from an
efficient bureaucracy if they assume power. This comes close to the
situation in Germany, but is somewhat more complex due to the
contradictions concerning the role of bureaucracy. 
Even though the traditional separation between politics and
administration is no longer explicitly advocated, there is still a tacit
preference for a de-politicised administration, especially if connected with
the implementation process. This is based on the following factors. First, a
neutral civil service is fixed in several laws and it is taken for granted that
no additional safeguards are needed on top of existing regulations to ensure
that administrators will respect the political will of parliament. A second
point is that party politics are expected to end if a law has passed
parliament,55 largely because administration is seen as law-enforcement and
not as a continuation of policy making outside parliament. Third, there is a
great lack of feedback from the implementation process to parliament,56
allowing legislators to be satisfied with passing the law and not being forced
into laborious evaluation activities. Even if a de-politicised administration
and a neutral process of law implementation are fictitious, there are no
pressures for policy makers to move away from these comfortable ideas. 
Unsurprisingly, this system is not free from incoherence. Despite the fact
that ministerial responsibility is recognised without reservations, public
perceptions, including those of opposition parties, of course, are at odds
with its implementation. If instructions are made public, which does not
happen very often, negative responses prevail as ministers are suspected of
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serving partisan or clientelist purposes. Ministerial instructions are more
generally thought of as a tool for correcting bureaucratic non-compliance
rather than providing policy direction beyond what is already fixed in law.57
This has forced incumbent ministers as well as ministerial officials to take
an almost hypocritical stance. Whereas they have no problem in
emphasising their hierarchical position vis-à-vis agencies in general, they
dislike admitting that single agency decisions have been overturned or
reversed by ministerial instructions. Facing the political costs of public
punishment,58 ministers and their bureaucrats are inclined to treat all agency
matters, including instructions, as an internal administrative affair.59 The
underlying rationale is that the legitimacy of a hierarchical mode of
governance requires that agency activities are administrative in nature, thus
avoiding any suspicion that ministerial instructions may collide with, or
even reverse, parliamentary decisions that have defined agency tasks in the
first place.
EX-POST CONTROLS AND THE MALLEABLE MEANING OF
BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY 
Usually, P–A analyses start with the assumption that delegation almost by
definition is creating a control problem.60 As the previous sections have
shown, to a considerable extent German politicians are released from
conflicts over control and fear of shirking. Consequently, the problem of ex-
post controls may appear less relevant. But reconsidering the argument that
the advantage of independent agencies is the use of pure expertise for
addressing complex problems and to generate credible policy commitments
and continuity,61 it might at least be asked how German policy makers cope
with a system of agencies that apparently is not well equipped to harvest the
fruit of independence.
To begin with, German politicians would probably disagree with the
account that agencies are not independent. There are even typical
statements, supposing that a certain agency is professionally independent
(fachlich unabhängig) and the minister decides only questions of political
relevance. But the arbitrary element in this distinction, which obviously
serves the purpose of dispensing with the need for further outside scrutiny,
is that it is within the supervising department’s competence to decide
whether a case is still professional in nature or already political. The
resulting leeway for oversight is enormous. It even allows ministerial
departments to impose their political rationality on scientific judgements. In
such case, agency expertise is not challenged outright as being wrong;
rather, ‘scientists are expected to consider economic and political factors in
the course of producing a reasoned, scientific judgment’.62 Thus, in the
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German perception, expertise does not hinge on autonomy but can be
achieved whilst taking account of political obligations.
The somewhat indeterminate meaning of agency independence is not
limited to Germany. Already a modest comparative outlook reveals that
bureaucratic autonomy is not as sacred as it may appear at first sight. A
recent British survey has shown, for example, that general managers
constantly struggle with ‘political interference on operational management
decisions’.63 Swedish central agencies, which are typically described as
being independent from their political principals, also display a different
picture. Larsson describes the Swedish system ‘as one in which ministers
have as much influence over the bureaucracy as in other countries, but
without the corresponding responsibility’.64 Finally, it is well known that the
independence of US agencies and commissions is not based on isolation
from political influence, but is rather attained through a precarious balance
between Congress, interest groups, and the president, all struggling for
influence over agency policies. Political independence may be achieved if
no single actor has more influence than his competitors,65 but this is not
necessarily the case. 
On the one hand, these observations call for a more thorough
determination of the concept of agency autonomy. The important point,
however, is that independence is obviously framed in different mindsets in
such a way that British, Swedish, and American politicians accept political
independence as an instrument to achieve policy goals. In contrast, the idea
that administrators should make policies is rejected in German normative
thinking. One of the practical consequences is that overseeing departments
try to suppress obvious policy ambitions from below. This is often done by
denying that agency decisions are political and insisting that they are only
technical or legal in character. 
Majone has argued that there is a functional need to have more non-
majoritarian institutions, because of pressures to conform to international
regulatory regimes and the domestic problem of overcoming ‘short-
termism’.66 The abstract solution to both problems is to delegate policies to
institutions that are detached from electoral cycles and are trustworthy
because they have nothing to gain if they give in to partisan or clientelist
demands. As to the credibility problem, Majone probably overestimates the
ensuing need for non-majoritarian institutions. The cases of the BAW and
RegTP illustrated that the German style of handling pressures is to pretend
that the institutionalisation of a public function is demonstrating sufficient
honest effort to enforce a regulatory policy. Given their complexity, the
credibility of this strategy is only damaged if ministerial micro-management
reverses the overall goal to a significant extent. Credibility is probably a less
ambitious aim of government policies and is accomplished on a lower level
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as well. Second, non-majoritarian institutions are not the only way to
achieve policy continuity. In Germany, continuity already results from a
system of dispersed government powers, complemented by a culture of
negotiated policies. This allows the relevant economic and political interests
to be considered in the political as well as in the administrative decision
making process.67 The persistence of this ‘policy of the middle way’68 is
especially visible after partisan changes of government, which have not yet
been accompanied by radical policy changes. With continuity being a
general characteristic of German policy making, it is less urgent to protect
agencies against the U-turn aspirations of subsequent governments. 
In a way this is reflected in the patterns of ministerial oversight that
show no signs of fixing policies for the long term. Administrative guidelines
and other measures to cope with agency policies are dealt with in an almost
secret fashion and therefore are not subject to public scrutiny or open
political deliberations. Furthermore, ministerial oversight is not statutorily
defined in terms of intensity, regularity, or instruments. Not least due to the
departmental principle, it is up to each department to decide how to deal
with an agency. Frequently used monitoring techniques are reporting
requirements, pre-checking press releases or reserved agreements in relation
to more important decisions. Agency officials in turn know which questions
could bother the overseeing department and protect their position by
providing first-hand information to the department. It must be added,
however, that the day-to-day work of most agencies is not greatly subject to
interference by ministerial instructions. Agencies may be left alone for long
periods, either because there is no need for closer inspection, no interest, or
no personal capacity. On balance, the oversight behaviour of German
ministerial bureaucrats more closely resembles the ‘fire alarm’ than the
‘police patrol’69 approach. But instructions remain an option and agency
officials anticipate this. A by-product is that strong agency activism has
remained a rare exception. 
Delegation is often referred to as an act of granting broad powers to
administrative agents. A peculiarity of the German understanding is to think
of delegation from the opposite direction. According to the German
constitution, ‘the content, purpose and scope’ (Art. 80 para. 1 GG) of the
range of delegated power must essentially be written into a parliamentary
law. Pre-defining the ‘essentials’ of administrative action requires very
detailed laws that tend to reduce administrative discretion. And, in fact,
there is some evidence that German administration is equipped with less
discretion than is found in France, Britain or the US.70 At the same time,
however, increasing complexity of legislative goals has caused
parliamentary laws to include infinite law terms such as ‘public safety’,
‘unreasonableness’, or ‘urgency’.71 In cartel law even the central concept of
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‘competition’ is left open to definition.72 More recently, the relevance of
‘informal’ or ‘cooperative administrative action’ was stressed as an
emerging procedural standard that opens greater leeway to agencies. The
impression of German administrators as lagging behind the discretionary
powers in other countries may therefore be overdrawn. But this is not the
problem. Regardless of deviations in practice, the constitutional doctrine of
delegating only plainly circumscribed functions to administrative agents
leads, if even implicitly, to a view of administrative agencies as non-
political actors and restricted to applying the law. This also explains why
German policy makers do not perceive administrative discretion as a severe
problem. As compared to US legislators, who deliberately employ a wide
range of constraint categories, including spending limits, legislative veto,
rule making requirements or exemptions as instruments of political
control,73 most of these measures, in theory at the disposal of German
legislators as well, are usually not considered in the law making process,
because it is assumed that the average law contains sufficiently detailed
guidance for administrators. A consequence of this somewhat circular
argument is that legislators are not forced to behave like typical principals
who are obsessed with the problem of misuse of administrative discretion. 
PRESSURES FOR CHANGE
The recent debate on delegation and non-majoritarian institutions has
largely been caused by the increasing importance of such institutions for the
traditional model of representative democracy. As this process continues, it
would be unrealistic to expect Germany to be left completely unaffected.
Pressures for change indeed emerge from different sources. The process of
European integration is a major source of pressure. 
Majone puts forward the most explicit arguments in this respect.74 They
are based on the assumption that EU policies contribute to the
transformation of the positive state, which was characterised by nationalised
industries, redistributive policies, and taxing and spending as main
instruments, into a regulatory state, which concentrates on rule making and
generating competition. This new mode of governance is said to replace the
old, rather centralised, command–control-based model of government
administration by a more decentralised variety of commissions and
agencies. Even if the overall story seems persuasive, at least from a German
perspective, the assumed pressure for national adoption appears more
diffuse and less powerful for institutional reform. Grande and Eberlein also
put forward the argument of an emerging regulatory state, but are more
cautious as to the ensuing administrative ‘architecture’75 that may take
different shapes depending on the regulated sector. The often remarked
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strong sectoralisation of the German political economy, which is reflected
in the views of actors who like to emphasise the peculiarities of their policy
field, supports the conclusion that inter-sectoral spill-overs of the agency
model (as seen in the case of the UK) are inhibited by divergent modes of
governance.76 The adaptive pressure of EU deregulation policies are
therefore not only channelled and potentially absorbed through the genetics
of national politico-administrative systems, but also meet policy sectors
with variable adaptive rationalities. Quite a similar conclusion is drawn by
Börzel and Risse, who argue that there must a perceptible ‘misfit’77 between
European and national policies and institutions until adjustment pressures
can succeed. This is not to say, however, that European policies still lack an
impact. A less visible but nonetheless important change resulting from
deregulation is related to the mandate of agencies. Since the early 1990s the
traditional agency function of state oversight (Staatsaufsicht) with its
hierarchical connotations and anti-competitive bias is slowly being replaced
by a less industry-sponsoring but more consumer-oriented mandate,
increasingly aimed at facilitating sectoral competition. So far Germany has
resisted a visible agencification as a response to EU policies. But it is likely
that EU liberalisation strengthens the public awareness and support for re-
regulation and thereby makes the use of agencies more acceptable in policy
domains such as energy or food safety. 
A second source of change is the recent NPM discourse in which
agencification of federal or central government executive structures is
explicitly advocated as a tool to increase public sector performance.78
Underlying this discourse is an entrepreneurial model of agency behaviour
that advocates the splitting of operational functions from policy functions,
the latter remaining in conventional ministerial departments. In the German
version of NPM, the focus is on decentralising responsibility and contract
management,79 and its main success has so far been at the level of agenda
setting and prompting activities for internal reorganisation, modernising
civil service law and personal management, use of information
technologies, improving team work and co-operation in federal authorities,
and so on. This makes the federal government look like a radical
moderniser, however, reform activities are still circumventing basic
institutional features, especially the instrument of agency independence.
An assessment of the impact of NPM on the traditional hierarchical
model has to consider that the mixture of organisational decentralisation,
performance controls, contracts, and operational independence makes it is
hard to measure non-compliance with the NPM prescription. It would be no
problem either to follow the NPM agenda by decentralising or granting
more operational autonomy to a number of agencies with unimportant
service functions, such as civil and military procurement, foreign language
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translation or maritime affairs, while retaining hierarchical control over the
political relevant ones. Aside from such an adoption à la carte, the question
remains whether and to what extent a core area of federal administration
possesses enough institutional inertia to resist an ongoing modernisation
process. The pressure for change will presumably not be exercised through
direct demands for institutional reform. Considering the opaque conditions
under which federal agencies operate, NPM discourse could instead shed
light on outdated modes of hierarchical control and activate a re-
examination of the benefits of bureaucratic autonomy. Currently, however,
neither incumbent politicians nor ministerial bureaucrats seem to be willing
to accept changes.80 Despite such reservations against the institution-
transforming power of EU-driven deregulation and the modernisation
discourse, it has to be acknowledged that the pressures for change, if only
incremental, are nagging at the traditional administrative model. An outline
of likely changes for the German case follows in the concluding section.
CONCLUSIONS 
This discussion has used the notion of institutional genetics to explain the
subordinated status of federal administrative agencies in Germany. Four
elements shape the genetic code: (1) the conflict reducing executive
centrism of agencies; (2) the unchallenged status of ministerial
responsibility that makes (3) hierarchy an important construction principle
for administrative organisation; and (4) the idea of a neutral, de-politicised
civil service that allows policy makers to trust in uniform implementation
standards. The extent to which this code determines ex-ante agency design
and ex-post controls depends on whether institutional dynamics or
institutional choice dominates. In the German case, an institutional
dynamic, prevailing over long periods, has routinely ‘auto-piloted’ those
parts of political decisions that involved the design and control of agencies.
Typical P–A considerations such as fear of ‘shirking’ or conflict over
control are thereby mostly absorbed and relax the necessity for policy
makers to consider alternative options. The result is a low preference
posture in relation to agency design and control. These questions are clearly
more regarded in an instrumental and choice-based fashion in political
systems such as the US or a polity in the making such as the EU, in which
the separation of constitutional powers creates multiple P–A relationships.
As opposed to the sequential structure of the German political system, such
variability opens the window to pursue policy goals via agency design and
control. 
As we know from genetics, evolution is difficult to suppress in the long
run – even stable institutional settings may be forced into evolutionary
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adjustment. With regard to the three characteristics of the German agency
landscape, it is possible to make a ranking of expected persistence. The least
protected attribute is the resistance to create new agencies with regulatory
powers. Pressures either from the EU or domestic sources are likely to push
forward this instrument more firmly in the immediate future. Somewhat
more durability can be expected of the political role of agencies. Due to
their executive-centred position, there are few incentives for political actors
to giving them a greater political role, although the functions delegated to
them might be important. Additionally, on the normative dimension, agency
activism is still contrary to the preferred division of labour between politics
and administration. Finally, bureaucratic autonomy is least likely to succeed
over the traditional model of hierarchical governance for similar reasons.
Neither pressures to make credible commitments nor efforts to secure policy
continuity can be translated into a need for more non-majoritarian
institutions. These characteristics of the German case are not evident at first
sight since observers usually turn their attention to more obviously
expressed interests of political actors. But previous findings suggest that
non-instrumental, unreflected or low preference behaviours are equally
relevant as goal-oriented and rationalist forms of action and therefore
deserve a similar degree of analytic attention. 
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